It’s difficult to know where to look. Even as Lebanon is being bombed and Iranian officials are issuing dire warnings, the situation in neighbouring Pakistan is deteriorating, and fast. Multiple crises are unfolding, with the tragic deaths of two Chinese nationals in an insurgent attack sending shock waves through the nation. Days earlier, the country was torn apart by a massive political rally, which defied threats of violence to send a message that the present government was seen as illegitimate. Then there are the almost daily attacks against security forces along its border. In response, the government is lashing out in all directions. But those it hits, are hitting back.
Crisis One: Escalating Violence
There’s no doubt that the relationship with China is going to take a hit, as the suicide attack killed two of its nationals who were part of a convoy transporting workers to the Port Qasim project—just one of the many in Pakistan where Chinese workers are deployed. Those killed were reportedly part of a team negotiating a key deal on the contentious issue of IPPs (Independent Power Producers), where the Chinese were accused of overcharging for the electricity produced.
The Chinese spokesperson’s remarks were sharp, reflecting Beijing’s frustration with Pakistan’s inability to provide security. However, it rather uncharacteristically described the attack as an “attempt to sabotage China-Pakistan relations”. No prizes for guessing who framed that narrative.
The Baloch have repeatedly stated that they have no quarrel with the Chinese. What they fear and hate is the colonisation of their province by the ‘Punjabis’. Notably, not a single Chinese national was attacked during the August uprising, which saw some 70 people killed in targeted attacks against those from the neighbouring province. Attacks in Pakistan always have their own context. For instance, the Taliban accused Pakistan of staging an attack on the Chinese workers at the Dasu power project in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in March this year, in an attempt to undermine growing Afghanistan-China ties.
Meanwhile, Chinese nationals live in cordoned-off areas and are protected by a security force of 18,000 personnel, among other measures. Recently, the Chinese Ambassador noted that its investors had brought in $5.5 billion into the power sector, contributing 18.2 per cent to total capacity, despite the delayed payment of $1 billion. This, along with the difficulty of repatriating profits from Pakistan to China, is likely to make the second phase of CPEC rather thorny, to say the least. However, it appears that a rather expensive debt rescheduling agreement has been announced, which will stagger the repayment process.
Crisis Two: Political Paralysis
More trouble for the relationship is brewing as the date for the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) summit approaches. In a repeat performance of its 2014 protests during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has managed to paralyse not only Rawalpindi and its surrounding areas but also spread into Lahore and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Unlike 2014, however, the sheer size of the protests, particularly the influx from the tribal areas, seems to have caught the army off guard.
Trouble erupted as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Chief Minister, Amin Ali Gandapur, was effectively placed under house arrest, even as protesters reached Islamabad. Widespread arrests followed, including those of Imran Khan’s sisters, 564 protesters, some 120 Afghan nationals, and, according to the Interior Minister, 11 plainclothes personnel.
When a state starts arresting its own police forces, not to mention detaining a Chief Minister, it signals deep trouble. Meanwhile, PTI is expected to continue its protests until the SCO summit, even as the state has cut off all access to the incarcerated former Prime Minister, with even his lawyers being denied entry. The core of Imran Khan’s protests centres on supporting the judiciary in its battle with the establishment, as well as countering the ruling coalition’s efforts to undermine PTI’s strong presence in Parliament. That’s another story—and the next likely crisis.
Crisis Three: The Constitutional Crisis
As Justice Athar Minallah observes, Pakistan has been in a near-continuous state of constitutional crisis due to the constant interference of the military and the overbearing ambitions of its occasional civilian leaders. The former was evident when six judges of the Islamabad High Court wrote to the Supreme Judicial Council, effectively accusing the intelligence agencies of attempting to subvert proceedings. The latter is apparent in the current government’s desire for a “Constitutional package” designed to curtail the Supreme Court’s power.
One key proposal within this package is the establishment of a new Federal Constitutional Court, tasked with handling petitions strictly related to the interpretation of constitutional clauses. Unsurprisingly, the judges of this court would be nominated by the President and the Prime Minister.
Another target is a controversial ruling by the Supreme Court in May 2022, which stated that legislators could not vote against their party line in Parliament. This appears to be an attempt to pressure wavering PTI legislators into voting against Imran Khan when required. Another reported amendment seeks to prevent high courts from issuing orders against army officers in matters of “national security,” though it remains unclear who would define what constitutes “national security.”
Meanwhile, the proposal to try Khan in a military court will likely face both legal challenges and physical resistance from the PTI. More trouble lies ahead, as there is little chance the PTI will allow this to happen without a fight.
Crisis Four: Violence Continues To Rise
Finally, it’s not just the Baloch groups or even the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) likely to worsen matters—though these and affiliated groups account for 92 per cent of all violence. The problem is that the state continues to make the same mistakes, over and over again. This was most recently evident when it decided to proscribe the entirely peaceful Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), a predominantly Pashtun group protesting the daily indignities faced by locals from a predatory establishment. The movement had announced a three-day national gathering this week, which was set to include opposition and PTI members.
While this may have unnerved the security establishment, their response only aggravated the situation. They refused permission to the charismatic Mehrang Baloch, a peaceful activist advocating for the Baloch cause, from travelling to an event organised by Time magazine, where she was to be honoured alongside 100 others. The magazine reported her harassment by security, which opened another can of worms, sparking outrage among her supporters who voiced their anger on social media. The situation was further exacerbated by an inept administration mishandling a sensitive issue.
There are even more severe crises, such as the serious impact of climate change, the drying up of rivers, and numerous social challenges, all of which are likely to surface in varying degrees soon. However, the bottom line is this: the state has detached itself from governance, and it’s not just the armed forces who bear responsibility. Political parties have made no effort to legitimise themselves in the eyes of a weary public grappling with inflation, power shortages, and various other issues they might tolerate if they saw the administration making even the slightest effort.
But political leaders know their future hinges on pleasing an extraordinarily aggressive army chief and his minions. Popularity and service to the state are distant priorities. The army itself is not, and never has been, a provider of good governance, despite its pervasive presence in the bureaucracy and institutions ostensibly geared towards “national security”—a term it interprets with an extremely narrow lens. While this situation is sadly familiar in Pakistan, the difference now is the convergence of these crises. Should another storm break, be it real or metaphorical, it could be the last straw.
The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.
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