We are celebrating a unique event, something 99 per cent of the nations never get to celebrate—a military victory. On December 16, 2021, India celebrates the Golden Jubilee of the Fall of Dhaka, the surrender of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers and the creation of Bangladesh; effectively the bifurcation of Pakistan into two nations. It is also called Swarnim Vijay Diwas. Much has been written about the circumstances which led to the war, the geopolitical compulsions and the strategic considerations but not enough on the personalities who finally applied the strategy and executed the operational art (OA).
The level at which the military strategy is converted to a set of ‘doables’ on ground is the operational level, and the techniques by which the highest commander’s intent is converted to a set of intended tactical actions, coordinated through plans and directions to the tactical level, is called OA. The formation at which OA is most applicable is the corps, but very often divisions on widely separated axes and operating virtually independently but with a final strategic convergence also execute OA. The entire 1971 campaign was much to do with OA because of the grandiose strategic plan which took nine months of making and preparation. It could have been laid to waste if the three- and two-star military commanders had not understood and executed the plan with due diligence and guidance.
The Eastern Front
In the east there was the Headquarters (HQ) Eastern Command, Kolkata, under Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora with its three corps size formations: 2 Corps, 33 Corps and 4 Corps. Another formation pulled in to fill gaps but which played a crucial role in the campaign was 101 Communication Zone Area (CZA), originally located in Shillong. The HQ assumed the status of an active division HQ. It was allotted 95 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Hardev Kler, who won a Maha Vir Chakra for his daring command.
The General Officer Commander (GOC) of 101 CZA was Maj Gen Gurbaksh S. Gill, another hard taskmaster who was the only General Officer to be severely injured in the campaign. This was immediately after the very first success, where he had gone to take the surrender of 31 Baluch company at Kamalpur post and his vehicle hit a mine. He was relieved by Maj Gen Gandharv Nagra who was moved from the command of 2 Mountain Division at Dinjan. 101 CZA had the least troops, the longest approach to Dhaka and a wide frontage. Yet, it was the first to reach the gates of Dhaka. Nagra is seen in most photographs after the surrender ceremony.
The other corps virtually had their areas of responsibility determined by the natural division of Bangladesh by the river system. 2 Corps under Lt Gen T.N. Raina (later Indian Army Chief from 1975 to 1978) was the youngest formation raised for the war. Its task was to advance from the east with two divisions to the important townships of Khulna and Jessore, a well-defended sector because of the direct approach from West Bengal. 4 Infantry Division under Maj Gen Mohinder Singh Brar headed for Khulna and Major General Dalbir Singh led 9 Infantry Division to Jessore. Dhaka could have been taken by 2 Corps but for the heavily built-up areas and broad river systems between the West Bengal border and Dhaka which provided immense defence potential to Pakistan. This approach to Dhaka, though difficult, was the shortest route from the Indian mainland in West Bengal.
The segment between the 101 CZA and 2 Corps was the north-west boundary of East Pakistan with townships such as Bogra and West Dinajpur. 33 Corps under Lt Gen M.L. Thapan conducted the operations here. Primarily, it was Maj Gen L.S. Lehl’s 20 Mountain Division with some add on elements of 6 Mountain Division which had been inducted from Bareilly. Facing it was Pakistan 16 Division under Maj Gen Nazir Hussain Shah, an officer originally from pre-Partition Garhwal Rifles. The Battle of Hilli in the Bogra sector was perhaps the most effective resistance that the Pakistan Army put up on the eastern front. 6 Mountain Division under Maj Gen D.K. Chandorkar was the formation tasked to secure the Siliguri corridor and induct into the north should a Chinese threat develop towards the corridor.
4 Corps in the north east and east was the largest corps and was commanded by Lt Gen Sagat Singh. It comprised 8 Mountain Division under Maj Gen K.V. Krishna Rao (later Indian Army Chief), 57 Mountain Division under Maj Gen Ben Gonsalves and 23 Infantry Division under Maj Gen R.D. Hira. The application of forces entailed 23 Mountain Division to Chittagong sub sector and partly reinforcing main efforts of 4 Corps, 8 Mountain Division to Sylhet sub sector and 57 Mountain Division to Akhaura sub sector. The latter afforded the shortest run to Dhaka but River Meghna cut through the sub sector and posed the biggest obstacle.
It was clear that Dhaka was not going to be a cake walk if it had to be tackled at all. To even effectively threaten it meant getting to its outskirts. 2 Corps in the west had the problem of strong Pakistani defence potential and difficult manoeuvre. 4 Corps had River Meghna as a major obstacle and 101 CMZ had long distance and shortage of troops as the main challenge. However 4 Corps had a Corps Commander who had been in operations since 1961, always displayed energy and could take risks. Lt Gen Sagat Singh commanded the Parachute Brigade in the operations to liberate Goa in 1961. He was the GOC 17 Mountain Division at Gangtok during the Nathula incident in 1967 and was responsible for operations in Mizoram too. He was constantly on reconnaissance-seeking ways by which he could put his troops across the Meghna. Finally with the full support of Group Captain Chandan Singh, the Air Force Commander, Sagat Singh heli-lifted an infantry unit (4/5 Gorkhas) across the Meghna to overcome the disadvantage of the Pakistani destruction of the Ashuganj bridge.
Now into the Dhaka bowl, 4 Corps had the advantage of relatively unimpeded advance to the outskirts of Dhaka. The fall of Dhaka was facilitated by this action, the arrival of 101 CMZ from the north and the Para Brigade led by Brig (later Lt Gen) Mathew Thomas. The role of Maj Gen JFR Jacob, the Chief of Staff HQ Eastern Command, was no less significant in the overall coordination of operations and negotiating the surrender, including the transportation of 93,000 Prisoners of War with no casualties.
The Western Front
Turning to the Western Front where the strategy was to conduct offensive defence, HQ Western Command under Lt Gen K.P. Candeth had a huge range of responsibility, from Ladakh to just south of Bikaner. Under him were two corps-size formations, 15 Corps and 11 Corps. 15 Corps under Lt Gen Sartaj Singh (a George Medal winner from World War 2) with HQ at Udhampur had 3 Infantry Division (Leh), 19 Infantry Division (Kashmir), 25 Infantry Division (Rajouri), 10 Infantry Division (Akhnur) and 26 Infantry Division (Jammu). It covered the area which is the responsibility today of 14 Corps, 15 Corps, 16 Corps and 9 Corps.
HQ 11 Corps was at Jalandhar under Lt Gen N.C. Rawlley. It had 15 Infantry Division (Amritsar), 7 Infantry Division (Ferozepur), a newly raised Fox Sector (subsequently 16 Infantry Division) at Abohar and various sectors including BSF elements in the Bikaner area. This area is today covered by two corps-size forces with additional divisions and offensive forces.
Western Command stiffly resisted Pakistani attempts at getting footholds at Fazilka and Dera Baba Nanak. It then unleashed 1 Corps under Lt Gen K.K. Singh. 1 Corps was a dedicated offensive reserve with 36 Infantry Division, 54 Infantry Division and 39 Infantry Division responsible for the neutralisation of the Pakistan Army in the Shakargarh Bulge which always bore potential of being used against the Jammu-Pathankot road or south into the Gurdaspur sector. A dedicated reserve of 1st Armoured Division and 14 Infantry Division was deployed south of the River Sutlej. It is K.K. Singh’s 1 Corps which fought the last battles as the flames of resistance were doused in East Pakistan. Two Param Vir Chakras were won here—Maj Hoshiar Singh and 2/Lt Arun Khetarpal at Basantar.
India’s Southern Command was commanded by Lt Gen G.G. Bewoor (later Army Chief who succeeded Field Marshal Manekshaw). He moved his HQ from Pune to Jodhpur and had two divisions on his order of battle. These were 11 Infantry Division (responsible for the Barmer sector stretching up to Bhuj) and 12 Infantry Division at Jaisalmer. This front was extremely active with operations such as the one for the capture of Naya Chor, a penetration of 65 km in the desert. This was preceded by a highly successful Jonga/Jeep-based commando style operation led by Lt Col Bhawani Singh, MVC, the Maharaja of Jaipur.
12 Infantry Division, however, was subjected to an ambitious attack on its defences at Longewala but the same did not succeed despite almost two regiments of Pakistan armour being invested in this mission to take Ramgarh and threaten Jaisalmer. After the initial resistance by Major K.S. Chandpuri MVC and his company of 23 Punjab, the Indian Air Force under Wing Commander (later Air Marshal) M.S. Bawa played hell into the Pakistani armour in the desert, with the famous pictures of circles in the sand going viral in the media of the time.
Among the other personalities who participated in the war, great credit goes to Maj Gen Inder Gill (later Lt Gen and Army Commander Western Command) who was DG Military Operations (DGMO) and was known to be virtually living in the MO Directorate through the run up to and during the war. His ability to contest Manekshaw on professional issues was well known and the latter appreciated that in a big way. Having ‘yes men’ around him was never Manekshaw’s style.
In the course of this narrative many names have been missed due to constraints of space. Each and every soldier, airman and sailor played his part. It was an operation which without jointness, diplomacy and political astuteness could never have been successful.
The writer is a former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps and Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the stand of this publication.
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