Understanding Mayawati

The victory of the Bahujan Samaj Party in the 2007 Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh and Mayawati’s subsequent statements that she hopes to become the next prime minister heading the Third Front, has attracted widespread attention. Often dismissed as a mercurial and corrupt leader heading an opportunistic, power hungry party that joined hands with the “communal” Bharatiya Janata Party, there is intense curiosity today about Mayawati, her ideas, goals and programmes.

The BSP is the product of two post-independence forces: A long-term process of democratization which has questioned the privileged position historically occupied by the upper castes and classes; and state policies of affirmative action which offer the scheduled castes a more inclusive space in Indian society. Consequently, the BSP was formed by a post-Independence, educated, politically conscious generation of middle and lower-middle class Dalits who actively oppose domination and expect a share in the fruits of post-Independence development. Mayawati epitomizes this generation.

Born into a lower-middle class family that took interest in the writings of Dr Ambedkar, she early imbibed an interest in the contemporary problems of the community, which brought her into politics. This generation believes - as Mayawati’s early speeches reveal - Dr. Ambedkar was humiliated by Mahatma Gandhi during the Poona Pact of 1932 and more important, the nation-building project and Indian democracy which emerged was exclusionary and elitist, controlled by, and meant for, the upper castes.

Further, disillusioned with the Indian state and mainstream political parties for failure to provide protection to their life, property and dignity; they hold that capture of state power by a Dalit party is essential to create a more just society “from above”.

The BSP undoubtedly has a number of seminal achievements that have contributed to the social deepening of democracy: The creation of a new identity and counter-ideology of Dalit and Ambedkarism as an alternative to Harijan and Brahminism, respectively, has provided Dalits a new confidence and self-respect. Consequently, the BSP was able to break down the vertical patron-client relationship with the upper castes, replace the Congress as the party representing the Dalits and consolidate Dalit vote in UP.

These developments have created a rising tide of aspirations among educated and politically aware Dalits in the country who look up to the BSP and support its endeavour for a pan-Indian presence.

Yet, it is questionable how empowering the BSP has been for the vast majority of subaltern Dalits. Both a party and a movement, its electoral success is due to the ability of Kanshi Ram and Mayawati to constantly re-invent the party and adopt strategies of electoral mobilization or alliances in response to the rapidly changing political scene in UP. In the late 1980s, a period of heightened polarisation due to Mandal and Masjid, the BSP was a radical social movement virulently hostile to the upper castes and parties representing them.

By the mid 1990s, realizing that it could not come to power alone, it shifted to an opportunistic political party that joined hands with the BJP to capture power. Once in power, Mayawati immediately put in place a slew of pro-Dalit policies that consolidated the Dalits behind her leaving the BJP leadership tremendously unhappy. With the decline of identity politics by the late 1990s, it has adopted the strategy of Sarvajan, attempting to gain the support of the upper castes in recent years.

Equally important, the BSP throughout the 1990s did not offer an economic vision or agenda for Dalit upliftment. The party came to power in 1995 based on a critique of the Congress described as anti-Dalit, but had little to offer as an alternative. It spent considerable amounts on ‘Dalit-oriented’ programmes like Ambedkar Villages, Periyar Melas, Ambedkar statues and memorials aimed at providing political empowerment, and consolidating the Dalit vote, but contributed little to their economic upliftment. These programmes emptied the treasury and put UP in a ‘debt trap’ with little funds left for investment in key sectors such as education, infrastructure and health, which was harmful for the economy, particularly the poorest sections, which include a substantial section of the Dalits.

The leadership failed to realise that sectional development was not possible in a situation of underdevelopment in the state.

However, some of Mayawati’s pronouncements and the economic agenda unveiled by her government after achieving a majority in 2007 provide room for some cautious optimism that now the focus will be on all-round development of the state and all sections of society.

The BSP’s goal of using its strategy of Sarvajan and its new economic policies is to create a broad-based umbrella party similar to the combine that enabled the Congress to rule UP in the past, the difference being that Dalits would occupy the commanding positions. Mayawati also hopes to replicate it in other states, build a pan-Indian identity and capture power at the centre.

Accordingly, in July 2007 the BSP announced that the “priority areas” of the government would be “rural development, agriculture, social development and infrastructure, all round development of all social segments not only Dalits and making the state conducive for attracting investment”.

Mayawati was able to persuade the Centre to provide substantial funds: A special economic package for all round development, a special area incentive package for developing the backward regions of Purvanchal and Bundelkhand and other developmental programmes. A target was set of 10 per cent growth rate and reduction of poverty by half during the 11th Plan period.

To win over industrialists and also help disadvantaged groups, Mayawati offered a voluntary scheme of “incentives” and “facilities” in the form of tax and other rebates to the former for setting up units in UP if they reserve 30 percent jobs in them for members of the SC, OBC, minorities and the “economically backward upper castes”. On completing six months in office, Mayawati claimed in November 2007 that her government had put into place a three-pronged agenda of improving law and order, a slew of inclusive developmental as well as pro-poor policies.

But BSP could face formidable political compulsions in implementing the new agenda as it has to balance the interests of all the social groups that voted it to power. The upper castes, who supported Mayawati expecting a share in political power and economic benefits, will not hesitate to return to the BJP if they feel neglected. The expectations of the Dalits will be that a BSP-headed government, moving beyond self-respect and political empowerment, should provide substantial material improvement and bring them into more prominent positions in society and polity.

Some of Mayawati’s actions on assuming office indicated attempts to reassure the upper caste and consolidate their support, best reflected in the composition of her cabinet. This expectedly brought a reaction from Dalits, leading to the announcement in June 2007 of the decision to demolish the Gomti Nagar Cricket Stadium in Lucknow to replace it with a memorial to Dalit leaders. It was widely viewed as an attempt to reassure Dalits as there were reports of discontent particularly among the youth, with her increasing emphasis on Brahmins on assuming power.

Some policies specifically for Dalits and other weaker sections were subsequently announced: Revival of Ambedkar-Village programme, housing and drinking water schemes for urban-based poor Dalits and attempts to ensure actual possession by Dalits of land allotted to them.

The success of the UP experiment - strengthening the Sarvajan base and implementing an inclusive developmental agenda - is of great importance for the BSP, evident from Mayawati’s efforts to explain these policies in her current electoral campaign across the country. But unless it works in UP, extending it elsewhere would be difficult. It is for this reason that the coming Lok Sabha election, the first after capturing power in 2007, is a testing time for Mayawati.

The National Democratic Alliance and United Progressive Alliance are in difficulties leaving space for alternatives: Both have lost important regional allies and are weak in UP; the former remains internally divided, while the latter is weak in big states such as Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra and lacks a clearly designated leader. In this fragmented situation where small parties with a sizeable number of seats can play a central role, Mayawati hopes to emerge victorious leading the Third Front.

Even though this seems unlikely at present with the Front an inchoate medley of parties lacking organisational cohesion or common programme, the BSP could play a significant role in government formation, and its future trajectory in national politics will be keenly watched by political observers.

(Sudha Pai is professor at Centre for Political Studies at New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University. She is the author of Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution, the Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh.)